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1 Introduction
During 2007 and 2008 the global financial system has undergone a period
of unprecedented instability. The difference, however, between past financial
crises and that which appears to have begun in earnest in August 2007 is the
presence of the credit derivatives (CDs) market.
Whilst the causes of this crisis are fairly well recognised, the mechanism
of transmission of shocks between CDs markets and the banking sector is not
as well understood from an empirical perspective. In fact, the academic and
practitioner literature has not yet reached firm conclusions on the financial
stability implications of credit default swap (CDS) instruments. Several recent
contributions such as Goldsmith-Pinkham and Yorulmazer (2010) and Behr
et al. (2010) have focused on specific aspects of individual banks and their
interactions with the credit and debt markets.
The objective of this paper is to shed some light on the propagation mech-
anism involved in banking stability by studying the credit default swap (CDS)
index market during the 2003–2009 period and exploring the dynamics of the
correlations of financial institutions’ equity and asset values with various CDS
indices as the subprime crisis of 2007 unfolded and then evolved into the global
financial crisis of 2008.
We adopt a contingent claims approach, which explicitly integrates forward-
looking market information and recursive econometric techniques to track the
evolution of default risk for a sample of 16 large complex financial institu-
tions (LCFIs) and the classic distance to default (henceforth D-to-D) model
for the pricing of corporate debt first established in Merton (1974a) and Mer-
ton (1974b). Since one of the most important determinants of CDS prices
is the likelihood of the reference entity to default in case of a credit event,
and this likelihood is tightly linked to stock market valuation, it is natural to
empirically investigate the link between the stock market and CDS markets.
The paper investigates the links between the value of banks’ equity and
the CDS market. The basic idea is that, as banks deliberately undertake risky
projects that embed counterparty risk, the value and volatility of the banks’
assets will co-evolve with developments in CDS markets. Our paper makes
two distinctive contributions. The first is a new approach to modelling bank-
ing fragility that explicitly incorporates the transmission of corporate credit
risk from the CDS index market. Our model thus contributes to the existing
literature on credit risk models and measures of systemic risk by exploring the
intuition that CD premia are univariate timely indicators of information per-
tinent to systemic risks. While applications of the D-to-D methodology have
so far mostly concentrated on the option pricing literature, we show that the
Merton approach can be applied to the area of credit risk transfer (CRT).
We estimate, recursively, a vector autoregression with multivariate autore-
gressive conditionally heteroskedastic disturbances (VAR-MV-GARCH) model
on bank equity returns and the change in value of two representative CDS in-
dices (the North American CDX and the European iTraxx). The CDS indices
are used to proxy the embedded counterparty risk present in the global econ-
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omy and act as volatility instruments in a multivariate stochastic volatility
option pricing model. Utilising the volatility forecasts from Monte Carlo sim-
ulations, we obtain the forward looking empirical distribution of equity and
hence asset volatilities. We subsequently compute the probability of default
for each institution included in the sample.
Our second contribution is in the final part of the paper, where we impute
the required ‘extra assets’ for each institution, based on the distribution of the
volatility of their own assets, given a target probability of default, which is set
by the regulator. We believe that this setting constitutes a useful predictive
tool that financial regulators may wish to employ to gauge the implications
for the stability of systemically important financial institutions given develop-
ments in CDS markets.
As far we are able to determine, this is the first investigation to establish
a relationship between the CDX and iTraxx CDS indices and the banking
sector that supports the consideration of a transmission mechanism in order
to account for the potential of default risk of several global LCFIs. We adopt
a working definition of banking instability as an episode in which there is a
significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock occurs in the CDS
market. The existing studies measure changes in cross-market interdependen-
cies but fall short of exploring changes in the first and second moments of
CDS indices. This is the key novelty of our approach. It is important to note,
however, that this formulation inevitably simplify and abstracts from real-
ity by ignoring critical dimensions of broader system-wide financial stability
assessments.
Our most important findings are twofold. First, we find that LCFIs are
conditionally correlated to changes in the valuation of CDs. More specifically,
we find that the sensitivity of default risk across the banking system is highly
correlated with both the CDX and iTraxx index markets and that this rela-
tionship has, on average, a positive sign and changes in magnitude through
time. Hence, correlations between financial institutions equity prices and the
CDS index market matter. Second, our model allows us to quantify the sol-
vency ratio for each LCFI via the overall price-discovery process in the two
CDS index markets.
All our results have important implications both for the financial stability
literature and for global banking regulators. The results help to quantify the
correlations between of shocks from the CDS market along with their volatility
to a specific metric of financial stability, namely the probability of default of
LCFIs. Our approach can serve as an early warning system for supervisors to
pursue closer scrutiny of a bank’s risk profile, thereby prompting additional
regulatory capital and enhanced supervision to discourage practices that in-
crease systemic risk.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. §(2) briefly reviews the
related literature. §(3) outlines the theoretical foundations of our approach.
§(4) outlines our choice of LCFIs for our sample and describes the financial
data used in the study. The results are presented in §(5) and §(6) concludes.
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2 Related Literature
To our knowledge, the closest precursor to our analysis is the research by
Bystrom (2005) and Gropp et al. (2006). Bystrom (2005) finds a link be-
tween equity prices, equity return volatilities and CDS spreads for a set of
data from the European iTraxx CDS indices and stock indexes and finds that
CDS spreads have a strong tendency to widen when stock prices fall and vice
versa. Stock price volatility is also found to be significantly correlated with
CDS spreads and the spreads are found to increase (decrease) with increasing
(decreasing) stock price volatility.
Longstaff (2010) finds that, during the subprime crisis of 2007, the value
of asset-backed collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) (using the ABX index
as proxy) had a strong predictive power for stock market returns (using the
S&P 500 and the S&P 500 financial subindex as proxies). He demonstrates
empirically that the ABX indices were signalling critical information on market
distress for as much as three weeks ahead of the onset of the crisis and finds
strong evidence supporting a contagion mechanism – from the ABX index
to other financial markets – driven primarily by market premia and liquidity
channels as opposed to the correlated-information channel.
Although the data used in the study covers the period between 2006 and
2008 and results focus only on the 2007 subprime crisis, the study constitutes
a highly valuable contribution as it sheds light on the potential correlation
between the ABX index market and other financial markets.
The recent and growing literature on financial innovation and financial sta-
bility is characterised by a lack of consensus on the net effect of CRT on the
financial system. Duffie (2008) discusses the costs and benefits of CRT instru-
ments for the efficiency and stability of the financial system. The argument is
that, if CRT leads to a more efficient use of lender capital, then the cost of
credit is lowered, presumably leading to general macroeconomic benefits such
as greater long-run economic growth.
CRT may encourage excessive levels of leverage raising the amount of total
credit risk in the economy to unwarranted levels, thus amplifying the effect of
negative credit shocks to the system. Allen and Gale (2000) develop a model of
banking and insurance and show that, with complete markets and contracts,
inter-sectoral transfers are desirable. However, with incomplete markets and
contracts, CRT can occur as the result of regulatory arbitrage and this can
increase systemic risk.
Using a model with banking and insurance sectors, Allen and Carletti
(2006) document that the transfer of risk between the banking sector and
the insurance sector can lead to damaging contagion of systemic risk from
the insurance to the banking sector as the CRT induces insurance companies
to hold the same assets as banks. If there is a crisis in the insurance sector,
insurance companies will have to sell these assets, forcing down the price, which
implies the possibility of contagion of systemic risk to the banking sector since
banks use these assets to hedge their idiosyncratic liquidity risk.
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Morrison (2005) shows that a market for CDs can destroy the signalling
role of bank debt and lead to an overall reduction in welfare as a result. It is
suggested that disclosure requirements for CDs can help offset this effect.
Baur and Joossens (2006) derive the conditions under which loan secu-
ritisation can increase the amount of systemic risks in the banking sector.
They use a simple model to show how securitisation can reduce the individ-
ual banks’ economic capital requirements by transferring risk to other market
participants, and demonstrate that stability risks do not decrease as a result
of asset securitisation. As a result, systemic risk can increase and impact on
the financial system for two reasons. First, because the risks are transferred
to unregulated market participants, who are obliged by the regulators to hold
additional capital reserves, and second, because the risks are transferred to
other banks, interbank linkages increase and subsequently augment systemic
risk. A recent study by Hu and Black (2008) concludes that, thanks to the
explosive growth in CDs, debt-holders such as banks and hedge funds have
often more to gain if companies fail than if they survive. The study warns
that the breakdown of the relationship between creditors and debtors, who
traditionally worked together to keep solvent companies out of bankruptcy,
lowers the system’s ability to deal with a significant downward shift in the
availability of credit.
There is also limited consensus on the relative importance of CDS and
bond markets, and even less consensus on the CDS–equity markets relation.
Zhu (2006) discusses the role of the CDS market in price discovery in the
corporate fixed income security sector. Using a vector autoregression (VAR)
framework, he finds evidence in favour of the hypothesis that the CDS market
moves ahead of the bond market, thus contributing more to price discovery.
Similar to the approach adopted by Zhu (2006), Longstaff et al. (2005)
find that changes in both CDS premiums and stock returns often lead changes
in corporate bond yields. In the Jorion and Zhang (2007) investigation of the
intra-industry credit contagion effect in the CDS market and the stock market,
the CDS market is found to lead the stock market in capturing the contagion
effect.
The traditional literature on the empirical applications of the Merton
Model has long recognised that the D-to-D measure can be an efficient an-
alytical predictor of individual firm’s fragility. A vast number of contributions
have been developed, particularly in the banking literature. Sy and Chan-Lau
(2006) measure bank vulnerability in emerging markets using the D-to-D. The
indicator is estimated using equity prices and balance-sheet data for 38 banks
in 14 emerging market countries. They find that the D-to-D can predict a
bank’s credit deterioration up to nine months in advance and it may prove
useful for supervisory core purposes.
Berndt et al. (2005) examine the relationship between CDS premiums and
Expected Default Frequencies (EDFs). Moody’s KMV EDFs are conditional
probabilities of default, which are fitted non-parametrically from the historical
default frequencies of other firms that have the same estimated D-to-D as the
targeted firm. The D-to-D is the number of standard deviations of annual
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asset growth by which its current assets exceed a measure of book liabilities.
They find that there is a positive link between 5-year EDFs and 5-year CDS
premiums. However, the sample only includes North American companies from
three industries. The results therefore might not be representative of the whole
market.
Gropp et al. (2006) show that the D-to-D may be a particularly suitable
way to measure bank risk, avoiding problems of other measures, such as sub-
ordinated debt spreads. The authors employ the Merton’s model of credit risk
to derive equity-based indicators for banking soundness for a sample of Euro-
pean banks. They find that the Merton style equity-based indicator is efficient
and unbiased as a monitoring device. Furthermore, the equity-based indicator
is forward looking and can warn of a crisis 12 to 18 months ahead of time.
The D-to-D is able to predict banks’ downgrades in developed and emerging
market countries.
Lehar (2005) proposes a new method to measure and monitor banking
systemic risk. The author proposes an index, based on the Merton model,
which tracks the probability of observing a systemic crisis – defined as a given
number of simultaneous bank defaults – in the banking sector at a given point
in time. The method proposed allows regulators to keep track of the systemic
risk within their banking sector on an ongoing basis. The approach permits the
comparison of the risk over time as well as between countries. For a sample
of North American and Japanese banks (at the time of the Asian crisis in
1997/98) the author finds evidence of a dramatic increase in the probability of
a simultaneous default in the Japanese banks whilst this decreases over time
for the North American banks. This type of model is applied to large complex
banking groups in Berger et al. (2008)
There are several mechanisms through which the CD market may act as a
conduit for the transmission of shocks between financial institutions. First as a
direct consequence of holding holding these instruments on their balance sheet
and their subsequent revaluation (for instance by writing protection on assets
that suddenly deteriorate in quality). Second, through individual counter-party
adjustments caused by sudden changes in the credit quality of other LCFIs, for
instance the sudden adjustments in interbank rates after the Lehman Brothers
default. Third, by changing the systemic or market wide component of credit
risk (in the parlance of Longstaff (2010)) on all transactional parts of the
financial system. This follows on directly from the ideas set out in Longstaff
et al. (2005) who propose a triply stochastic poisson process with idiosyncratic,
sectoral and market risk in the pricing model.
We attempt to capture these affects in the asset process by including broad
CDS indices constructed from CDS written on corporate debt from a cross
section of large US and European firms. The indices form a barometer of
the level of global credit risk, which should in turn reflect the credit risk
in the wider economy. These indices are combined into a multivariate model
that captures at least two components of the presumed default risk structure
(idiosyncratic and market wide).
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3 Methodology
We divide our empirical analysis into three sections. In the first section §§(3.1),
we develop a theoretical framework for calculating levels of default risk subject
to a policy objective. In the second section, §§(3.2), we outline a generalised
stochastic volatility model of bank assets with multiple volatility instruments.
Finally, in the third section, §§(3.3), we define an econometric model using
a vector autoregressive model with multivariate autoregressive conditionally
heteroskedastic disturbances (VAR-MV-GARCH) to determine the time evo-
lution of the joint volatilities of the equity and our benchmark CDS indices.
We also extend this model to infer forward-looking simulations of the joint
evolution of the asset value process and hence determine the additional asset
requirements for each individual LCFI.
3.1 Default Risk and Policy Objectives
We use the term distance to default (D-to-D) or default risk in order to follow
the generally accepted convention in the previous literature in this area as this
proxy is considered a valid measure of insolvency.
Consider a policy maker setting a target default risk probability, p∗ over
the time horizon T − t, defined as p∗, such that for any systemically important
institution, pi,t ≤ p∗, is imposed by a regulator. The probability of default at
time t, for the ith institution, will be conditioned on both the imputed value
of the assets, VA,t and their volatility, σA,t.
For any given systemically important financial institution suffering from
financial distress, with probability of default, pi,t, the difference in probability
p∗−pi,t, under the assumption of conditional normality, will correspond to the
difference between the minimum D-to-D set by the regulator and the current
imputed distance:
δi,t = η (p
∗)− η (pi,t) (1)
where η(·) denotes the number of standard deviations from default calculated
under p∗ and pi,t respectively. When δi,t is negative the D-to-D is below a
tolerable level for the regulators and an asset injection of γi,t = VA (p
∗) −
VA (pi,t) is required to restore the institution to the acceptable level of default
risk. We define γi,t as the asset shortfall at time t.
Consider VE and VL as the observed value of equity and liabilities respec-
tively at time t. We can treat the calculation of the banks solvency ratio as
a typical option pricing model by adopting the standard approach that treats
VE as equivalent to a European call option on assets at time T , a period that
we impose exogenously.
Treating the value of the liabilities as fixed, the value of this call option with
strike price VL will be dependent on the properties of the underlying stochastic
process driving the value of assets, with structural parameters θA(µA, σA) and
the current value of these assets VA,t
VE,t = C (t, T, VA,t, VL,t, θA) . (2)
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Because the value of the assets is uncertain, the price of the call option will
be proportional to the probability of default
p ∝ C (t, T, VA,t, VL,t, θA) . (3)
For a regulator the objective, at time t, is to assess whether the probability
that the value of assets, VA at T , being less than the value of liabilities VL,
should not exceed p∗
VL,T∫
0
Γ (VA,T ; t, T, VA,t, θA) ds ≤ p∗ (4)
where Γ (·) is the terminal probability density function at T of the value of
assets VA,t.
3.2 A Stochastic Volatility Model of Bank Assets
We motivate our proposed relationship between the fluctuations of the banks’
assets and developments in the market for CDS by considering the evolution
of assets VA of a typical bank with liabilities VL, conditional on developments
in the CDS market.
Liabilities are fixed and are of known value and liquidity. Assets are chosen
from a portfolio of risky underlying assets and hedging instruments to achieve a
target level of risk exposure. The overall portfolio of assets is constructed from
vectors of individual unhedged risky assets, S(t), and hedging instruments,
H(t), such that VA(t) = α
′S(t) + β′H(t).
The vectors α and β represent, respectively, weights of individual assets
and hedging instruments that the bank chooses in order to target a level of
exposure consistent with the target level of volatility σ∗,VA . Counterparty risk
is embedded into the hedging contracts used to control the banks’ exposure.
Such risk is captured by a vector of instruments representing the uncertainty
surrounding the reliability of the hedging instruments’ valuations.
We consider that this risk vector is driven by a k − 1 length set of instru-
ments xi ∈ {x1, . . . , xk−1} which can be regarded as representing counterparty
risk embedded into the hedging contracts used to control the banks’ exposure.1
Combining the assets and the instruments in the second risk vector, we
define the k length vector x˜ (t) =
[
VA (t) , x
1 (t) , . . . , xk−1 (t)
]′
and the mul-
tivariate stochastic differential equation that denotes its time evolution as
follows
dx˜ (t) = µ (x˜ (t) |θ ) dt+ σ (x˜ (t) |θ ) dW (t) (5)
1 Suppose you have a holding of value 100 in a single representative risky asset with
volatility of 25%. A portfolio of hedging instruments is constructed to reduce exposure to all
but 5% of fluctuations of this risky asset. Should the terminal value of the risky asset drop
by 20%, then the hedging instruments should provide an in-flow of 19, leaving a loss of 1.
Let us now assume that the hedging portfolio provides a realized in-flow of 10 instead of the
anticipated 19, the difference of 9 is the additional loss due to counterparty risk exposure.
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where µ is a vector/matrix function of drifts, σ is a vector/matrix function
driving volatility and W (t) is a k dimensional Weiner process, i.e. W i (t+ h)−
W i (t) ∼ N (0, h). Turning to the the nature of µ(·) and σ(·), we proceed
following the approach suggested by Williams and Ioannidis (2011) and adopt
a stochastic covariance model of the form
dx˜ (t) = r (x˜ (t)) dt+Σ
1
2 (t) (idiag (x˜ (t)) dW (t)) (6)
ΣA (t) = A (t)A
′ (t) (7)
A (t) = ivech (log a (t)) (8)
da (t) = λ (a (t)) dt+ ξ (a (t)) dW (t)
σ
(9)
where r (x˜ (t)) =
[
rVA (t) , µ
1x1 (t) , . . . , µk−1xk−1 (t)
]′
. The first term indi-
cates that the growth of assets is based on the instantaneous risk free rate r
and {µ1, . . . , µk−1} are the independent drifts of the instruments.
The stochastic covariance matrix ΣA (t) consists of a
1
2k (k + 1) vector
stochastic process a(t). For simplicity, we set λ, for the covariance process
to be zero and the volatility of volatility function, ξ (·) , is considered time
invariant, ai(t) ∈ R. Williams and Ioannidis (2011) derive the optimal num-
ber of hedging instruments for a simple stochastic covariance model to be
1
2k (k + 1) + 1, given k diagonal and
1
2k (k − 1) off-diagonal processes driv-
ing the volatility component. The attractive feature of this model is that it
enables the derivation of an analytic specification of a single quantity that
combines all the relevant variance and covariance terms, as ΣA (t) is guaran-
teed to be positive-semi-definite (PSD). The evolution of x˜(t) from time t to
t + h can be represented by an instantaneous multivariate Brownian motion
with covariance matrix
ΣA (t, t+ h) =
t+h∫
t
f (dW (t)
σ
)ds (10)
where f is a function that aggregates the steps in the volatility equation in 6.
The use of the ivech transformation ensures positive semi-definiteness (PSD)
on any instantaneous realisation of Σt and allows for its factorisation. Denot-
ing Σ1/2 (t) as a matrix square-root (we choose the Cholesky factor) of the
instantaneous covariance matrix Σ(t) and depending upon the complexity of
the assumed processes driving a we can establish an analytic solution to the
variance of volatility density or alternatively utilise Monte Carlo simulations.
A European call option on the bank’s assets would therefore be priced over
the integral of the possible volatilities
C (t, T, VA, VL |θ ) =
∞∫
0
Φ (σA)C˜ (t, T, VA, VL, σA) ds = VE(t) (11)
where VL is the strike price, T is the maturity of the call, C˜ denotes the Black
and Scholes price of a call option with volatility σE aggregated over all possible
paths s and Φ(σA) is the distribution function of volatilities.
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As we are unable to observe the continuous time asset process, we adopt
the specification that can predict the values of the call option, i.e. the value
of equity, that exhibits stochastic covariation with the evolution of our chosen
volatility instruments and we incorporate this property into an econometric
specification of equity. Consequently, the actual realisation of the volatility
of equity results from the matrix square root of the instantaneous covariance
between equity and CDS indices and not merely from the square root of the
realisation of its own variance.
The opaqueness of the over the counter (OTC) market, the lack of mar-
gin/reserve requirements and the somewhat arbitrary nature of mark to market
valuations of derivatives instruments, render the CDS indices a useful proxy for
the level of counterparty risk in the market, thus approximating the volatility
of the hedging instruments, H(t). Following this rationale, the equity vector
process y(t) will incorporate the bank equity and representative CDS indices
and their associated volatility processes Σ(t).
3.3 Econometric Specification
Under the framework illustrated above, we use a vector autoregression (VAR)
model, yt = Zyt−1 + µ + ut, with BEKK type multivariate autoregressive
conditionally heteroskedastic disturbances to define the discrete time dynamics
of the mean and variance systems.
We utilise k = 2 factors in the equity model, the returns on the CDX 5
year investment grade and iTraxx 5 year investment grade CDS indices. We
use the AAA tranches for both indices, i.e. the highest level tranches in the
CDS index. These indices cover the credit quality of large cross sections of
named bond issuers in North America (CDX) and Europe (iTraxx), which are
then equally weighted into an index. In each case we can think of these as
being a barometer for the credit conditions of the 125 largest companies in
these two economically important regions. An alternative approach would be
to utilise factor/principal component decompositions of large cross sections of
individually named CDS issuances and we intend to follow this approach in
future work.
Therefore, Z is the 3 × 3 matrix of lagged coefficients, µ is a vector of
intercepts and ut is a disturbance process with conditional covariance matrix
Etutu′t = Σt. Within this specification we are able to calculate the conditional
volatility of equity for each bank based on the evolution and volatilities of our
chosen instruments. This allows us to extract the conditional market values
for assets and their volatilities. We use then these estimates for calculating the
required extra assets under alternative volatility scenarios.
The vector of interest is the VAR of the equity returns and log differ-
ences of the CDX and iTraxx CDS indices, yt = [∆ log(VE,t), ∆ log(CDXt),
∆ log(iT raxxt)]
′. The VAR model to be estimated is given by
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 ∆ log (VE,t)∆ log (CDXt)
∆ log (iT raxxt)
 =
 z1,1 z1,2 z1,3z2,1 z2,2 z2,3
z3.1 z3,2 z3,3
 ∆ log (VE,t−1)∆ log (CDXt−1)
∆ log (iT raxxt−1)
+
µ1µ2
µ3
+
u1,tu2,t
u3,t

(12)
The model disturbances ut = [u1,t, u2,t, u3,t]
′ are driven by a first order MV-
GARCH conditional covariance model σ21,t σ1,2,t σ1,3,tσ2,1,t σ22,t σ2,3,t
σ3,1,t σ3,2,t σ23,t
 =
 k1 k2 k30 k4 k5
0 0 k6
 .
 k1 k2 k30 k4 k5
0 0 k6
′
+
A1 0 00 A2 0
0 0 A3
 .
 σ21,t−1 σ1,2,t−1 σ1,3,t−1σ2,1,t−1 σ22,t−1 σ2,3,t−1
σ3,1,t−1 σ3,2,t−1 σ23,t−1
 .
A1 0 00 A2 0
0 0 A3
′
+
B1 0 00 B2 0
0 0 B3
 .
 u1,t−1u2,t−1
u3,t−1
 . [ u1,t−1 u2,t−1 u3,t−1 ] .
B1 0 00 B2 0
0 0 B3
′
(13)
which is more compactly written in matrix notation as
Σt = KK
′ +AΣt−1A′ +But−1ut−1B′ (14)
where KK ′ is the intercept in the variance equation and A and B are the
3 × 3 ARCH and GARCH autoregression coefficients, respectively. The long
run covariance matrix of the VAR system disturbances takes the following
form
vecΣ = (I −A⊗A−B ⊗B)−1 vec (KK ′) (15)
The system is estimated using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) under
the assumption of conditional multivariate normality. To calculate a bank’s
default risk, δi,t, against the maximum acceptable probability of default, p
∗,
we use the estimated VAR-MV-GARCH model as follows. From the VAR-MV-
GARCH we calculate the conditional volatility of equity and, given the ob-
served values of equity and liabilities, we are able to solve for the imputed value
of assets and their conditional volatility (now as a function of the VAR-MV-
GARCH parameters), using the Merton (1974a) approach. To approximate the
integral in equation 11 we generate forward looking Monte Carlo pathways for
different asset volatilities and numerically derive the distribution.
In addition to standard significance tests on individual coefficients we have
also conducted systematic and block restriction tests on the inclusion and
exclusion of the two CDS indices in the equity mean and variance equations.
The daily volatility of equity needed, σE,t, to solve the option pricing prob-
lem is the top element of the Cholesky factorisation Σ
1/2
t of the conditional
covariance matrix. Recall that ut = Σ
1/2
t t, where  ∼ N (0, I3) is a three vari-
ate vector drawn from a zero mean, uncorrelated i.i.d normal distribution with
unit variance. Once the time evolution of σE,t is known, we can use the square
root sum over 252 trading days to construct a moving annualised equivalent.
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Repeating this exercise for a large number of draws forms the basis of our
simulation study.
3.4 Forward Looking Simulations
We draw N = 100, 000, one year (s steps of 252 trading days) pathways of the
3× 1 column vector εt (
y˜t+s, Σ˜t+s
) ∣∣ε˜t+(s−1), . . . , ε˜t; θˆ (16)
For each pathway, we compute the annualised average volatility.2 We use ∼
to represent the draw and evolution from each sample path. Following Hafner
(2003) who demonstrates that an MV-GARCH type process exhibits time
varying multivariate fourth moments, we conduct our simulation study across
the Monte Carlo paths to capture this effect.
We then sum over one forward-looking year Σ˜ =
∑252
s=1 Σ˜t+s|ε˜t+(s−1), . . . , ε˜t;θˆ.
Using the methodology of Merton, we then compute for each pathway the
value of assets, the volatility of assets, the D-to-D and the average probability
of default (V˜A, σ˜A, η˜, p˜).
We then weight each of these pathways by 1/N and sort them via the
pathway average asset volatility. We exclude the top and bottom 2.5% of the
simulated asset volatilities and stratify the rest into percentiles, ordered from
low to high volatility level. For expositional simplicity, we choose seven strati-
fications. For each of these volatility percentiles, σi∈1,...,10A , we then derive the
asset volatilities and compute the D-to-D for a variety of asset levels starting
with the current implied asset value VˆA,t. We obtain the current asset value by
deriving a mean of the asset values computed over the three trading months
(66 days) prior to April 29, 2009.
By constructing an upward sloping curve relating the extra required assets
∆VA against the D-to-D, for the i
th volatility percentiles, η∗|VˆA +∆VA;σiA,
we calculate the increase in assets necessary to re-establish adequate buffers
for each bank.
4 Data
Our data set consists of sixteen LCFIs and two broad investment grade CDS
indices. The sample covers the period from October 20, 2003 to April 29, 2009,
a total of 1,462 trading days. The chosen LCFIs consist of eight US based
institutions, three UK banks, two French banks, one German bank and two
Swiss banks. The Bank of England Financial Stability Review (2001), based
on the analysis undertaken in Hawkesby et al. (2003) sets out classification
criteria for LCFIs. In Wagner and Marsh (2006), more empirical evidence is
2 The variance–covariance matrices over all the paths will be centered around Σˆ.
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provided to illustrate the importance of these 16 LCFIs to the global financial
system.
It is not only an institution’s size that matters for its systemic importance –
its interconnectedness and involvement in a wide variety of financial markets is
also of significance. More specifically, the Wagner and Marsh (2006) inclusion
criteria target the top ten institutions, worldwide, for equity bookrunners,
bond bookrunners, syndicated loan bookrunners, FX revenues and holders of
custody assets.
To join the group of LCFIs studied, a financial institution must feature
in at least two of these six global rankings. We base our classification on the
2003 rankings so that all the systemically important financial institutions prior
to the 2007 financial crisis are included. These institutions are systemically
important as the fallout from a bank failure can cause destabilising effects for
the world financial system.
These financial institutions (labels/mnemonics/series types used in the ta-
bles are in parentheses) are ABN Amro/Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), Bank
of America (BOA), Barclays (BARC), BNP Paribas (BNP), Citigroup (CITI),
Credit Suisse (CS), Deutsche Bank (DB), Goldman Sachs (GS), HSBC Hold-
ings (HSBC), JP Morgan (JPM), Lehman Brothers (LB), Merrill Lynch (ML),
Morgan Stanley (MS), Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale (SG) and UBS Bank Corp. (UBS). In
addition, we consider Bear Stearns (BS), given its crucial role as market-maker
in the global CD market. In general, we adopt the criteria to sort the institu-
tions by country, US, UK, Germany/Switzerland and France.
The CDX (CDX) IG and iTraxx (ITRAXX) IG CDS indices are broad
investment-grade barometers of corporate credit risk and preliminary studies
suggest that these offer a reasonable benchmark of the corporate credit envi-
ronment. All data is obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Liabilities
are reported on a quarterly basis and are interpolated to daily frequency using
piecewise cubic splines. The equity values of the LCFIs utilised in the VAR-
MV-GARCH model are dividend adjusted. The market capitalization values
are computed from the product of the number of shares (NOSH), the clos-
ing equity price (PC) and the index adjustment factor (AF). The descriptive
statistics for all the series used in estimating the VAR-MV-GARCH models
are presented in Table 1.
5 Results and Analysis
The VAR-MV-GARCH models presented in equations 12 to 14 in §§(3.3) are
estimated using a 252 day (one trading year) rolling window over the chosen
sample period using maximum likelihood estimation, under the assumption of
conditional multivariate normality, using the sample from October 20, 2003 to
January 1, 2005 as a ‘burning-in’ period. In addition, we estimate the model
over the January 1, 2005 to April 29, 2009 sample as a comparator. For the final
one year period to April 29, 2009 we use a forecast breakdown approach in the
spirit of Diebold and Mariano (1995) and further developed in Giacomini and
14 Giovanni Calice et al.
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Rossi (2009) to test between the long run (whole sample estimated model), and
the short run (rolling window model); this is labelled the ‘best’ model for the
year to April 29, 2009. For each LCFI in the sample, the rolling window model
was strictly preferred and this is the model used in the simulation component
of the study.
Tables 2 and 3 present the coefficients for the ‘best’ VAR-MV-GARCH
model, from equations 12 to 14. The first column presents the label of the co-
efficient of interest, standard errors are in brackets. For individual parameters
the MV-GARCH model for each LCFI tends to have uniformly more statis-
tically significant coefficients than the VAR. However, individual significance
tests in this type of model are not always informative and, as such, we employ
a block restriction test for the exclusion of variables from the system.
For the ‘best’ model for the year to April 29, 2009 we implement a likelihood
ratio test of block exogeneity (statistical causation) in both the first and sec-
ond conditional moments for LCFIs’ equity with the two chosen CDS indices.
The null hypothesis of the linear independence in the moments of bank equity
returns for the same moments of the two indices were conclusively rejected in
all cases. These results provide the supporting evidence of the conjecture, em-
ployed in this paper, that developments in these markets (CRT) are significant
factors, but by no means unique, to be taken into account for conditioning the
moments of equity returns.
On the basis of these parameterised models, we now proceed to acquire
estimates of the ‘extra assets’ required as not to exceed a given probability
of default under alternative volatility scenarios. In practice the US, UK and
various European governments have taken various different approaches to sup-
porting the LCFIs during the crisis. The standard intervention has been a mix
of extra capital (via a mix of debt and equity purchases) and state backed
asset insurance. Our results compute the projected solvency of the banks un-
der a variety of volatility scenarios therefore the value of booked assets in
state backed insurance schemes will be the best benchmark for our figures.
For banks that have received only capital injections, the value of the implied
guarantee on asset values is less clear, nonetheless our results will serve as a
useful guide.
We begin by establishing a policy forecast period of one year. We compute
the simulations suggested in §§(3.4) for a year beginning on April 29, 2009.
This exercise is in effect a hindsight approach, given the current ‘best’ VAR-
MV-GARCH model to April 29, 2009, which provides the anticipated one year
spread of equity volatility.
On the basis of these simulations, we compute the asset injections required
for each bank under a set of different volatility scenarios. We categorise the
range of volatility as ‘low’, ‘medium’ and ‘high’. Adopting a regulatory target
of one standard deviation as the maximum default probability, we compute
the required asset injections as a proportion of a bank’s balance sheet assets
and in terms of trillions of dollars.
The results are presented in Table 4. The actual dollar asset shortfalls for
each bank are presented in columns 5, 6 and 7 for the ‘low’, ‘medium’ and
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Table 2 VAR model coefficients from equation 12 for the LCFIs in the sample, for the ‘best’
model for the year to April 29, 2009. These are the coefficients used in constructing the stress
testing and D-to-D forecasts for the sample LCFIs. The standard errors are presented in
square brackets. This information is then used to construct the forward-looking simulations
and stress tests presented in Table 4, standard errors are presented in square brackets.
BOA BS CITI GS JPM LB ML MS
z1,1 -0.0113 -0.0318 0.0375 -0.0244 -0.0626 -0.0657 0.0016 0.0342
[-0.4236] [-0.8225] [1.2636] [-0.8893] [-2.4093] [-2.2901] [0.0528] [1.1777]
z1,2 -0.0254 0.0001 -0.0318 -0.0643 -0.0466 -0.0938 0 -0.0185
[-1.8007] [-0.0009] [-2.4855] [-3.4293] [-2.8785] [-2.9560] [0.0192] [-0.8380]
z1,3 -0.0041 0.0001 -0.0076 -0.0464 -0.0094 0.0743 0 -0.012
[-0.2872] [0.0020] [-0.4409] [-2.4724] [-0.5516] [1.8530] [-0.0136] [-0.5116]
µ1 0.0002 0.0000 0.0004 0.0006 0.0007 0.0002 0 0.001
[0.6588] [-0.0392] [1.0349] [1.4241] [1.5715] [0.2585] [-0.0104] [1.8848]
z2,1 -0.0531 -0.0212 -0.0777 -0.1242 -0.1627 0.0254 -0.1728 -0.109
[-2.2633] [-0.9547] [-3.6325] [-4.4690] [-6.1065] [5.4799] [-7.9026] [-4.6862]
z2,2 0.0017 0.0338 0.0058 0.0414 0.0018 0.0119 0.0105 -0.013
[0.0576] [0.9596] [0.1761] [1.3895] [0.0631] [0.3737] [0.3240] [-0.3920]
z2,3 0.3044 0.3002 0.2871 0.2794 0.2797 0.3213 0.2717 0.2744
[9.4887] [8.2391] [8.8378] [10.3164] [9.0040] [10.4926] [8.6611] [9.3460]
µ2 -0.0004 0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0009 0.001 -0.0002
[-0.5762] [0.3858] [-0.9015] [-0.2899] [-0.4453] [-1.1401] [1.2882] [-0.3598]
z3,1 -0.0227 -0.0656 -0.031 -0.1158 -0.0935 0.0251 -0.2067 -0.0849
[-1.3274] [-3.8388] [-1.8029] [-2.7896] [-4.2327] [5.9592] [-11.094] [-4.139]
z3,2 0.1699 0.2249 0.1806 0.1625 0.1897 0.1777 0.196 0.1772
[8.1896] [8.3999] [7.8573] [5.0805] [9.1551] [8.7253] [7.7854] [8.0724]
z3,3 0.0207 0.0868 -0.008 0.0592 -0.0101 0.0158 -0.0516 0.0246
[0.7001] [2.7802] [-0.2678] [1.1994] [-0.3585] [0.5181] [-1.5831] [0.8470]
µ3 -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0006 0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0009 0.0011 0.0001
[-0.4649] [0.1077] [-0.8248] [0.0977] [-0.7388] [-1.3049] [1.2223] [-0.1055]
SG BNP DB CS UBS BARC HSBC RBS
z1,1 0.1017 -0.0138 0.0305 0.0891 0.0862 0.0048 -0.0269 -0.0349
[3.1936] [-0.4429] [1.0491] [2.8896] [2.9669] [0.1765] [-0.8874] [-1.1621]
z1,2 -0.0642 -0.0716 -0.0576 -0.0628 -0.055 -0.059 -0.0178 -0.076
[-3.5811] [-3.7117] [-3.4689] [-3.7513] [-3.1389] [-3.1565] [-2.2219] [-4.8168]
z1,3 -0.008 0.0063 -0.0088 -0.0104 -0.0234 -0.0241 -0.0152 0.0292
[-0.3921] [0.2852] [-0.4586] [-0.5841] [-1.1877] [-1.0576] [-1.4858] [1.4673]
µ1 0.0003 0.0008 0.0005 0.0005 0.0002 0.0005 0.0004 0.0009
[0.6782] [1.5088] [1.0748] [0.9706] [0.4751] [1.0103] [1.2968] [1.6641]
z2,1 -0.0166 -0.0482 -0.056 -0.0695 -0.0563 0.0024 -0.036 -0.0002
[-0.5052] [-1.3278] [-1.6155] [-2.0789] [-1.9555] [0.1182] [-0.7244] [-0.0096]
z2,2 0.0304 0.0259 0.0232 0.034 0.0113 0.0487 0.0202 0.0136
[0.9312] [0.8035] [0.7442] [1.0402] [0.3431] [1.4997] [0.6178] [0.4211]
z2,3 0.262 0.2639 0.2729 0.2667 0.2497 0.2779 0.295 0.2683
[8.2768] [8.4261] [8.9700] [8.5673] [8.0932] [8.6123] [9.5219] [8.3167]
µ2 -0.0003 0 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0007
[-0.4751] [-0.0012] [-0.4669] [-0.3456] [-0.6571] [-0.5610] [-0.2381] [-0.8107]
z3,1 -0.0492 -0.0558 -0.0674 -0.1078 -0.0563 -0.0195 -0.0551 0.0001
[-1.691] [-1.954] [-2.4214] [-3.6780] [-2.1120] [-0.9659] [-1.4221] [0.0099]
z3,2 0.191 0.1959 0.1895 0.1806 0.1877 0.2061 0.1892 0.1939
[8.1770] [8.7984] [9.1738] [8.1333] [8.3862] [9.0631] [7.9232] [8.5376]
z3,3 -0.0187 -0.0087 -0.0243 -0.024 -0.0202 -0.0161 -0.0021 -0.0001
[-0.6191] [-0.2927] [-0.8235] [-0.8244] [-0.6684] [-0.5277] [-0.0657] [-0.0061]
µ3 0 0 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003
[-0.1289] [-0.1046] [-0.5257] [-0.1985] [-0.4215] [-0.4229] [-0.1319] [-0.3982]
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Table 3 Variance model coefficients, for the ‘best’ MV-GARCH model for each LCFI in the
sample as described in equation 14. This model describes the evolution of the conditional
covariance in the disturbance process from the VAR model between the LCFI equity returns
and the returns on the CDS indices.
BOA BS CITI GS JPM LB ML MS
k1,1 0.0015 0 0.0023 0.0014 0.0014 0.0002 0 0.0021
[8.7168] [-0.5360] [13.7300] [5.9156] [6.7041] [0.0298] [0.5820] [7.6889]
k1,2 -0.0002 0.0026 -0.0001 0.0033 -0.0005 0.003 -0.0035 -0.0004
[-0.3719] [0.0895] [-0.1828] [7.1179] [-0.7325] [0.0292] [-0.1332] [-0.7655]
k1,3 0 0.0003 0.0003 0.0026 0 0.0039 -0.0013 0.0004
[0.0605] [0.0024] [0.7257] [1.6912] [-0.0958] [0.0300] [-0.0176] [0.8850]
k2,2 0.0043 0.0019 0.0042 0.0007 0.0041 0.0028 0.0004 0.0043
[11.8982] [0.0510] [12.0833] [0.4224] [11.7785] [0.0261] [0.0019] [11.6282]
k2,3 0.002 0.0014 0.0024 0.0089 0.002 -0.0012 0.0041 0.0022
[5.8932] [0.0076] [8.3134] [0.4646] [5.4553] [-0.0039] [0.0028] [5.7262]
k3,3 0.0035 0.0008 -0.0035 0 -0.0034 0 0.0011 -0.0037
[12.582] [0.0032] [-12.949] [-0.000] [-11.789] [0.000] [0.000] [-11.854]
A1 0.35 0.8178 0.4219 0.2584 0.2729 0.4538 0.7077 0.2849
[22.5452] [81.1842] [20.8889] [19.8571] [20.4104] [30.8470] [61.9968] [21.8299]
A2 0.2603 0.1882 0.2529 0.3318 0.2494 0.2912 0.259 0.2605
[16.7437] [16.6667] [17.4033] [19.2090] [16.6432] [15.5988] [14.8741] [17.1981]
A3 0.3152 0.0844 0.2526 0.4145 0.3356 0.3033 0.2829 0.3399
[19.7256] [10.4001] [17.7373] [10.1469] [21.9345] [15.8910] [14.2168] [19.6893]
B1,1 0.9427 0.7934 0.915 0.9657 0.9634 0.9474 0.8076 0.9603
[210.1620] [3498.8957] [137.5982] [348.5225] [311.4317] [392.6591] [1942.0523] [287.4377]
B2,2 0.9608 0.9817 0.9631 0.9449 0.963 0.9558 0.9663 0.9606
[236.0391] [578.0862] [261.2307] [198.0115] [249.8207] [196.1223] [259.3536] [241.2347]
B3,3 0.9452 0.9968 0.9599 0.919 0.9401 0.9481 0.9583 0.9373
[165.8104] [1671.9791] [236.6457] [65.0249] [160.0957] [151.3784] [168.1619] [145.9701]
SG BNP DB CS UBS BARC HSBC RBS
k1,1 0.0027 0.0025 0.002 0.0025 0.0017 0.002 -0.0001 0.003
[7.7069] [7.1997] [8.6885] [7.5796] [6.7697] [6.7754] [-0.1188] [11.7987]
k1,2 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0015 -0.0009 -0.0008 0.0026 -0.0015
[-2.1564] [-2.4321] [-1.6446] [-3.0490] [-1.3696] [-1.6578] [0.1171] [-2.5886]
k1,3 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0005 0.005 -0.0013
[-1.7587] [-1.6363] [-0.9367] [-0.8357] [-1.0657] [-0.8424] [0.1207] [-1.9268]
k2,2 0.0041 0.004 0.0042 0.0041 0.0042 0.0042 -0.0037 0.0038
[10.5663] [11.2480] [11.2697] [10.4623] [11.7192] [11.6208] [-0.2266] [11.0338]
k2,3 0.0016 0.0016 0.0017 0.0018 0.0017 0.002 0.0002 0.0015
[4.9476] [4.9615] [5.0011] [5.3294] [4.9811] [5.8228] [0.0039] [3.8540]
k3,3 0.0033 0.0033 0.0036 0.0034 0.0034 0.0035 0 0.0033
[12.380] [12.243] [12.346] [11.834] [12.501] [12.770] [-0.000] [12.101]
A1 0.3504 0.2747 0.2911 0.334 0.2643 0.3206 0.3359 0.5181
[19.9274] [14.7010] [21.5320] [18.7879] [16.9423] [24.3199] [22.9355] [46.2015]
A2 0.2642 0.2525 0.2767 0.2623 0.2704 0.2549 0.2465 0.2528
[15.8140] [15.6025] [17.4513] [15.8295] [15.7396] [14.6751] [15.1470] [16.9238]
A3 0.2956 0.3034 0.3158 0.2929 0.3111 0.2938 0.3405 0.2706
[18.4202] [18.1029] [18.6393] [17.0637] [18.0399] [17.3355] [16.7938] [17.4146]
B1,1 0.9391 0.9594 0.9568 0.9425 0.9656 0.9515 0.9533 0.8903
[183.1192] [175.9423] [259.8678] [157.8795] [251.3334] [281.5061] [240.4076] [145.0429]
B2,2 0.9591 0.9616 0.9559 0.9584 0.9571 0.9613 0.9633 0.963
[212.5441] [223.8041] [208.2144] [207.0664] [203.9593] [215.0648] [234.2748] [267.6662]
B3,3 0.952 0.9494 0.945 0.9519 0.9469 0.951 0.9376 0.958
[184.9690] [171.0815] [159.9146] [174.2307] [162.6896] [171.8329] [126.8111] [217.2194]
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‘high’ volatility scenarios, respectively. Columns 2, 3 and 4 present the asset
shortfalls divided by the average level of imputed assets for the three months
to July 31, 2007. This denotes the pre-crisis solvency adjustment by the bank.
A shown in table 4, an emerging striking feature is that, even under ‘low’
volatile scenarios, only two banks were not in need of additional capital in-
jections and asset insurance the imputed aggregate capital requirements were
approximately $2.16tr. This amount would have risen to $3.82tr and $5.7tr
respectively under less benign volatility profiles.
Specifically for the UK LCFIs, the relevant figures are $0.55tr, $0.95tr,
$1.38tr. Although the estimated capital injections are calculated under an
assumed maximum distance to default of one standard deviation, the results
provide ground for an informal comparison between our estimates and the
official recapitalization schemes of distressed banks. In particular, since the
onset of the financial crisis, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) received direct
government support in various forms in excess of GBP350bn, most of this
support has been in the form of asset insurance provided by membership of
the UK Asset Protection Agency (APA).3 An important observation is that
under a scenario of high asset volatility, our model estimates appear in line
with the actual recapitalization arrangements.
In the US the most obvious examples of recapitalization recipients via
public funds were Citi and Bank of America. Citi placed in the troubled asset
relief program (TARP) assets valued at $300bn and received an additional
$45bn as preferred stock from the US Treasury. As is evident from our simula-
tions, Citi would have needed an additional amount of capital of ($0.266tr to
$0.522tr) under a projected low-medium volatility regime. Bank of America
placed $118bn in the asset guarantee scheme and received $45bn in preferred
stock investments. The remaining banks received indirect support from the US
government as it stepped up efforts to mitigate systemic counterparty risks,
thus ensuring that individual institutions were adequately capitalised and in-
dividually capable of surviving reasonable stress events. For instance, during
the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve introduced a number of short-term
credit and liquidity facilities to help stabilise markets. Some of the transac-
tions under these facilities provided liquidity to institutions whose disorderly
failure could have severely stressed an already fragile financial system. Gold-
man Sachs was one of the heaviest users of these loan facilities, taking out
numerous loans from March 18, 2008 to April 22, 2009.
On balance, the ‘projected’ recapitalization needs for all the European
LCFIs range between $.35tr and $.78tr. As a proportion of their assets, the
required additional assets (in the form of capital and asset insurance) varied
from an average low of 7% to an average high of 22% depending upon the
realized volatility profile. Interestingly, we can see that in comparison with
their European-based counterparties, for a large number of US LCFIs, the
supplemental asset infusions were well in excess of 10%. Under deteriorating
3 Source: HM Treasury Publications, December 2009, ‘Royal Bank of Scotland: details of
Asset Protection Scheme and launch of the Asset Protection Agency’.
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asset volatility scenarios, these amounts increased very rapidly and more sig-
nificantly for the US LCFIs. Moreover, during periods of high asset volatility
(July 2007) the average injections required as a proportion of assets rose to
28%, well in excess of their UK and European counterparties for which the
equivalent measures were 13% and 15%, respectively.
Overall, our results indicate an elevated degree of fragility for the LCFIs,
with total assets in excess of $27tr and liabilities of $26.7tr. Furthermore, these
banks would have been vulnerable even under favourable volatility scenarios,
thereby requiring substantial capital injections and asset insurance to restore
them to financial health.
Table 5 presents the computed estimates from the simulations for the asset
values, the default probabilities and the resulting D-to-D for all the 16 LCFIs
over the one year forecasting period. Liabilities are kept at their 2007 level.
It is worth noting that the resulting asset to liabilities ratios for four banks
were below unity. Additionally, the estimated conditional asset volatility for
the US banks was substantially higher, at 3% compared with 1.7% for the UK
and European banks. More importantly, the volatility of volatility was almost
double in magnitude: 0.4% to 2.3%.
To the extent that the D-to-D is an adequate proxy of banking fragility,
our results suggest that the average D-to-D was only 2.9 standard deviations.
For three US LCFIs, the D-to-D was below 2 and the associated default prob-
abilities were the highest in the group. Not surprisingly, these LCFIs were
Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch, none of which were able
to survive the global financial crisis.
Notably, RBS was one of the most severely affected institutions during
the financial crisis. The take over of ABN-Amro in 2007, in addition to other
acquisitions over the preceding decade, had resulted in a rapid increase in the
total debt liabilities of the bank, which are in fact the largest in our sample, as
of July 31, 2007. Note that, over our stress testing period, the asset to liability
ratio of the bank surged to 98% (i.e. an insolvent state). It appears also that
Deutsche Bank was a further example of LCFI with a similar low asset to
liability profile. However, the point asset volatility and volatility of volatility
were substantially lower (in addition to having a far lower aggregate debt).
Therefore, Deutsche Bank appeared less vulnerable to shocks than RBS.
Within the cluster of non-US institutions, RBS had the highest average
probability of default, at a level of 17% compared to the non-US average of
10%. Furthermore, the maximum probability of default (47%) was the fourth
highest in the sample, immediately below Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and
Merrill Lynch.
Taken together, our results are are indicative of the types of transmission
mechanisms discussed in §(2). Illustrating some of the fragility within the
international financial system. The group of LCFIs in our sample have with
asset/liability values well in excess of about two times the annual GDP of the
US economy.
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In summary, the conditional volatility of banks’ assets, calculated using the
first and second moments of the indices in the CDS index markets, provide a
number of interesting insights into the important issue of default risk.
6 Concluding Remarks
Bank default risk is currently the predominant issue of concern to academics,
financial practitioners and policymakers across the world. The recent failure of
several LCFIs illustrates that the too big to fail paradigm predominant in the
analysis of financial stability of large mainstream commercial and investment
banks is no longer valid. We approach the issue of the stability of the banking
sector by studying the potential statistical relationships between the moments
of the CDS indices the equity of LFCIs.
In this paper, we propose a set of models and empirical tests for predicting
the current and simulated correlative relationships between CDS markets and a
number of systemically important financial institutions. Specifically, we jointly
model the evolution of equity returns and asset return volatility of 16 LCFIs,
using a VAR-MV-GARCH model, with the evolution of two standardised CDS
indices. The conditional equity volatilities are used to impute the value and
volatility of assets using a Merton type model.
The estimated conditional covariance of he CDS market and LCFI asset
volatility is captured by the evolution of the investment-grade CDX North-
American and the iTraxx Europe indices with LCFI equity. The multivariate
GARCH model is then used to construct forecasts of future volatility condi-
tioned on the co-evolution of the equity returns and the CDS market. The
econometric framework allows for testing of the predictive contribution of
developments in the CDS market on the stability of the banking sector as
depicted by the D-to-D of major financial institutions.
We conclude that there is evidence of correlative relationships between the
equity volatility of LCFIs and the volatility of the CDS index market matters
during the crisis period. In the presence of increasing asset volatility, financial
institutions would require fresh capital injections and additional assets enter-
ing insurance programs such as TARP and the UK APA. We view these results
as encouraging for the methodology, and we hope that the approach we take
will be useful in future explorations.
A caveat of the methodology used in this paper is that our calculations are
based on the assumption that the value of liabilities is known. Therefore, the
safety and soundness of each particular institution is a function of the market
value of the assets. Future research should relax this assumption and allow
for the stochastic fluctuation of the value of the liabilities and its possible
relationship with the value of assets. An additional innovation could be the
adoption of pareto-stable distributions in place of the normal distribution,
which is commonly believed to underestimate the true frequency of extreme
observations.
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